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Abstract 
 
This article examines how neoliberal reforms mediate and influence relationships between emergent 
powers and African nations centred on agricultural development. It investigates the impact of South-
South relations on the nature of development and technical cooperation, aid and investment, and on 
the configuration of relations between states, farmers and the private sector. It examines the extent to 
which the experiences of China and Brazil in developing their agriculture result in qualitatively new 
paradigms for agricultural development, and whether they create new openings for a redefinition of 
development policy and practice. Moreover, the article assesses whether South-South development 
cooperation merely reinforces the drive to capital accumulation unleashed by global economic 
liberalisation, reflecting strategies by emergent powers to acquire new markets for agricultural 
technology, inputs, services and new sources of raw materials. In conclusion, the article questions the 
extent to which alternative paradigms for development cooperation can be created within the 
institutional framework created by neoliberal reform. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, South-South development cooperation has come to the fore. This coincides with the 
global economic recession and the growing focus on Africa as a favourable source of raw materials, 
but also as a new frontier for financial investments, and investments in large-scale agriculture. There is 
a sharp divide in perceptions of the expansion of investment in Africa by emergent powers. Detractors 
argue that emergent nations are pursuing a strategy of placing commercial interests above policy 
reform and good governance in a framework of market liberalisation. This is countered by arguments 
that the investments of BRICS countries create new diversified opportunities based on symmetric 
relations or ‘soft power’ rather than coercion rooted in the vestiges of colonial rule.  
 
Like African nations, the emerging powers have also gone through processes of economic reform 
rooted in market liberalism during the 1980s and 1990s that have permeated and transformed their 
economies. This article examines how such neoliberal reforms mediate and influence the relationships 
between emergent powers and African nations. It investigates the impact of South-South relations on 
the nature of development and technical cooperation, aid, and investment, and on the configuration of 
relations between states, farmers and the private sector. It then examines the extent to which the 
experiences of China and Brazil in developing their agriculture result in qualitatively new paradigms 
for agricultural development, and whether they create new openings for a redefinition of development 
policy and practice. Moreover, the article assesses whether South-South development cooperation 
merely reinforces the drive to capital accumulation unleashed by global economic liberalisation, and 
so reflects strategies by emergent powers to acquire new markets for agricultural technology, inputs, 
services and new sources of raw materials. In conclusion, the article questions the extent to which 
alternative paradigms can be created within the institutional framework created by neoliberal reform. 
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2 Nurturing a dominant paradigm: The role of the US 
 
Advocates of South-South cooperation tend to present it as distinct from previous development 
paradigms, suggesting that it carries no baggage from a colonial past and involves nations who have 
collectively experienced and struggled against colonial domination. However, the dominant paradigms 
of agricultural development in Africa are not just based on the heritage of colonialism. A major, 
perhaps underestimated, influence lie in initiatives led by the USA in the late 1940s and 1950s to 
create new paradigms for development outside of colonial structures and within the constructs of free 
markets. The framework for this was Point Four of the Truman declaration, the inaugural speech given 
by President Truman on 20 January 1949. In this address, Point Three was an overt military strategy, a 
call for a collective defence arrangement to counter the rise of communism, which gave birth to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Point Four, on the other hand, was based on an effort to 
spread American influence through the transfer of technology and Western democratic ideals: 
 
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their 
poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas… The 
United States is preeminent among the nations in the development of industrial and 
scientific techniques… I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples 
the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their 
aspirations for a better life. And in cooperation with the other nations, we shall foster 
capital investment in areas needing development… The old imperialism - exploitation for 
foreign profit - has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of democratic 
fair dealing… Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to 
greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and 
technical knowledge (Truman 1949). 
 
 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the US built a programme of technical cooperation, which was 
delivered through the International Development Advisory Board, (which later evolved into the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID)) and through the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations (Perkins 1997; Arnove 1982). These three organisations were highly instrumental in 
organising an international institutional framework for agricultural research to contain the three 
perceived threats of famine, overpopulation and communism. The work of these three agencies 
resulted in the building of new scientific and technical institutions within African countries, the 
education of an epistemic community of African scientists and technicians ingrained with Western 
liberal values, and the creation of new international agricultural research structures that expanded 
plant breeding and agricultural technology innovations developed within the US for wider applications 
throughout the developing world. This formed the institutional infrastructure for the creation of the 
CGIAR system and the architecture through which the Green Revolution was initiated. 
 
Within African countries, new technical and research institutions were funded and international 
agricultural research facilities such as IITA (the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, 
established with headquarters in Nigeria as part of the CGIAR) were created to support adaptive 
research within national institutions and create new directions for agricultural research. Through these 
initiatives new technical and research institutions came into being and were shaped on the basis of US 
institutions and institutional values.  
 
Under colonial rule, the creation of an African scientific and technical cadre had been given low 
priority. Indeed, it was not until the 1950s that the colonial authorities began to build a network of 
national agricultural research and experimentation stations and hire expatriate scientific and technical 
staff (Hodge 2007). As a consequence, African nations attained national sovereignty with a very 
rudimentary agricultural research infrastructure that was seriously understaffed.  
 
The building of technical capacity involved overseas training programmes. The US provided 
programmes and scholarships for Africans to gain technical, scientific and social science education 
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within US institutions. Through these training programmes the US was able to build influence within 
the evolving development institutions within developing countries. Assessing these developments, 
Papanek (1969: 183) comments: 
 
As a result of progress towards a professional consensus, foreign economists working in 
many less developed countries have immediate and national allies in their national 
colleagues, who share their professional language and often their goals. The differences 
between foreign and national economists are disappearing. The universities’ future 
training, research and institutional involvement in the less developed world needs to take 
this development into account.  
 
Gouldner (1982) argues that the overseas training programmes co-opted third world leaders into an 
‘international occupation of experts and technicians who constitute a specific status group with status 
interests they wish to protect and advance’ (Gouldner quoted in Arnove 1982: 318). These 
programmes were initiated alongside programmes of learning about doing development, which also 
drew the social sciences into international development, including rural sociology, and anthropology.  
 
This led to the development of African Studies and Development Studies departments in American 
universities. More practical learning by doing programmes also involved the Peace Corps Volunteers. 
Open learning was also complemented with covert learning, with US university researchers in Africa 
and Peace Corps volunteers providing lucrative potentials for espionage in the context of the Cold War 
(Stockwell 1984). 
 
The US foundations supported the creation of networks to build the leadership capacities of African 
researchers and experts to recognise, understand and solve development problems. They fostered 
linkages between an intelligentsia across national borders within Africa with intellectuals within the 
US. They created a series of mutually supporting linkages among national organisations to meet 
national development objectives. The US foundations tended to define and shape the research and 
development objectives of these networks to foster US interests rather than utilise them to open up 
new areas of research and understanding outside of US concerns. Nevertheless the foundations’ 
support for research was often subtle, sometimes initiating research in areas critical of US interests. 
For instance, much of the research on what became to be dependency theory in Latin America was 
funded by the Ford Foundation. The independence of the foundations from the US government 
enabled them to initiate research in areas wary of US geopolitical ambitions and bring them into US 
circles of debate, by appeal to a nebulous concept of global development free of political interest 
(Arnove 1982).  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, much of the rhetoric of US commitment to international development in 
Africa took place in the context of opening up Africa to free markets and new influences; strategies 
that are now referred to as ‘soft power’. Unlike in South America, there was no previous history of US 
colonialism or imperial control, with the exception of Liberia. However, this was marred by the rapid 
escalation of the Cold War, which led US geopolitical interference to gain spheres of influence, to the 
Korean War, the Vietnamese War, and support for coup d’états throughout the world that toppled 
leaders that opposed US interests. 
 
US development programmes were initiated in the context of the Cold War. Soviet support for the 
anti-colonial struggle had won it many friends within Africa. This led to a divide in the bid to build 
African unity in the 1960s between the Casablanca Group made up of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, 
Algeria and Morocco, committed to radical socialist programmes and linkages with the Soviet Union, 
and the Monrovia group of more conservative states wishing to remain within the ambit of the colonial 
powers and US influence. Emperor Haile Selassie eventually negotiated a compromise between the 
two networks, resulting in the setting up of the Organisation of African Unity headquarters in Addis 
Ababa.  
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3 Competing interests 
 
As a result of these competing geopolitical interests, international development has never been 
hegemonic, but always a contested site of conflicts over knowledge and politics. While the US was 
able to shape the overriding architecture of international development, many African countries had 
technical cadres trained in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, and implemented mixed 
development plans combining elements of state planning, co-operatives and state farms, with US 
models of rural development, community development and the land grant system of agricultural 
extension.  
 
Many of the more radical African governments attempted to steer a more autonomous course, 
becoming members of the Non-Aligned Movement, which itself originally arose as an initiative of 
Yugoslavia, following its disagreements with the Soviet Union. The main advocates of the Non-
Aligned Movement in the early 1960s included Presidents Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, 
Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Nehru of India. The main principles 
included respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non interference in 
the domestic affairs of other states, relations based on equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-
existence. Many of the principles were initially developed in the context of early diplomatic relations 
between China and India, and China has continued to build upon these principles in its dealing with 
developing countries. Many of these values are therefore echoed in the articulation of principles for 
South-South relations in current discourse.  
 
During the 1970s, many African governments became disillusioned with international development 
and sought alternative visions (Arrighi 2002). During this era dependency theory was in vogue. The 
Non-Aligned Movement was instrumental in launching the Declaration for the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1974. The NIEO was a forum for promoting dialogue on restructuring unequal trade relations between 
developed and developing countries. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the end to the 
Cold War, combined with the hegemony of the US in international relations, the influence of the Non-
Aligned Movement and the NIEO has declined. Nevertheless, these principles continue to influence 
the rhetoric of South-South cooperation, although it occurs in contexts that are quite different from the 
original conception of North-South unequal relations and Southern solidarity based on self-
sufficiency. 
   
Ultimately, the world economic recession of the 1970s resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and 
the bankruptcy of many African nations who were forced to apply to the IMF for support. With the 
decline of a bipolar world competing for spheres of influence, African states were forced to implement 
a set of conditionalities made up of austerity macro-policy measures and neoliberal reforms that 
opened up the economies to global markets forces, and ‘good governance’ institutional reforms.  
 
This period had a major impact on African agriculture and continues to influence the trajectories of 
development efforts. Within Western international development circles, the crises being faced by 
African governments were constructed as the result of internal constraints: bad policies that 
undermined agricultural production. According to Bates (1981), African governments used the 
powerful instruments of state control and trade monopsonies to benefit a narrow circle of urban elites 
and party functionaries at the expense of farmers. The neoliberal ‘solution’ was to dismantle state 
control over the agricultural sector and enable farmers to take advantage of market opportunities. This 
thesis was elaborated by the World Bank into a theory of ‘good governance’ (World Bank 1989). In 
spite of the implementation of reform processes, African economies continued to lag behind during the 
1980s and 1990s as an increasing differentiation began to appear within the former colonies, with 
rapid rates of growth in some Southeast Asian economies, while the GNP of African states declined an 
average of 5 per cent between 1960-75 and 47 per cent between 1960-1999 (Arrighi 2002).  
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4 Economic crises, reform agendas and the struggle over resources 
 
Arrighi (2002) argues that the world economic crisis of the 1970s resulted in a crisis of profitability 
that intensified global competition. The US responded to this crisis by competing aggressively for 
capital worldwide to finance a growing trade and current account deficit on its own balance of 
payments, which resulted in an increase of interest rates worldwide and major reversals in the 
direction of global capital flows. In the period 1965-69, the US balance of payments recorded a 
surplus of US$12 billion. By 1975-79 this had turned into a deficit of US$7.4 billion and escalated to 
US$912.4 billion in 1995-99 (Arrighi 2002, based on IMF figures). By 2005 the US was running a 
deficit of US$700 billion, but receiving credits of US$900 billion as foreigners bought up government 
bonds and mortgage bonds (Roberts 2009). This enabled the US to create an expanding demand for 
imports controlled by US manufacturers of products they no longer found profitable to manufacture in 
the US, but which could be commissioned or produced by US companies by relocating manufacturing 
plants elsewhere. Harvey (2005: 93) suggests that:  
 
The real secret of the US success, however, was that it was now able to pump high rates of 
return into the country from its financial and corporate operations (both direct and 
portfolio investments) in the rest of the world. It was now the flow of tribute from the rest 
of the world that founded much of the affluence achieved by the US in the 1990s.  
 
Arrighi (2002) argues that these developments resulted in the rising expansion of wealth in the US and 
the bifurcation of fortunes within the developing world. On the one hand, countries with large pools of 
cheap labour and dynamic entrepreneurial networks (largely in Southeast Asia) were able to take 
advantage of these developments to participate in manufacturing for export markets. On the other 
hand, those that had largely depended upon export of natural resources and state organisation of 
manufacturing sectors enterprises, suffered from the downturn in primary commodity prices during the 
1980s, lack of capital markets and high costs of borrowing, and their lack of large supplies of 
industrial labour. As a consequence, while East Asian nations were able to mobilise labour supply for 
capital accumulation within manufacturing, the economies of sub-Saharan Africa sharply contracted 
and were forced to accept structural adjustment programmes.  
 
Adherence to structural adjustment programmes was not associated with an improvement but with a 
further deterioration in the economic performance of African states during the 1990s (Arrighi 2002). It 
was not until the 2000s that growth rates began to improve in sub-Saharan Africa to an average of 5 
per cent, in the context of the rise of commodity prices as a result of increasing world demand fuelled 
by the industrialisation of newly emergent nations. The economic recession in Europe and North 
America, linked to a financial and mortgaging crisis, and a crisis of profitability and faltering 
economic growth has resulted in new financial investments in Africa, particularly in the petroleum, 
mining, natural resource and agricultural sectors. Africa is now perceived to be a continent favourable 
to investment with returns on investment higher than in any other developing region, and a rapid 
growth of middle-class consumers and discretionary income (McKinsey Global Institute 2010). 
 
Following the 2006-2008 world food crisis there has been increasing interest in investment in 
agriculture in Africa and in the development of agriculture. This includes staple food production for 
the domestic market and for exports, and debates about the relative merits of supporting large-scale or 
small-scale agriculture linked into agribusiness food chains through contractual relations. Prior to this, 
there had been some development in new horticultural exports in Africa complementing traditional 
export commodities, within a food value chain governance system determined by supermarket chains, 
brand manufacturers, and governments, based on notions of certification (such as EuroGap and Global 
Gap), standards, quality control and systems of tracking produce to their original points of production. 
US and European investments in the agricultural sector during the 1990s and 2000s had often been 
less than enthusiastic, demanding institutional and governance reform, land tenure reform, 
privatisation and government investment in infrastructure as a precondition to investment. For 
instance, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) requires governments to meet 17 different 
‘independent’ and ‘transparent’ policy requirements to be eligible for support. US investors have often 
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chosen to invest in other regions rather than Africa, and promising innovations in agricultural 
production have often suffered from intensified competition from other regions. Nevertheless, recent 
initiatives such as the creation of an Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) under the 
auspices of the Gates Foundation, the support of the MCC for agricultural development, and the 
Millennium Villages Project reflect a renewed interest in agriculture and agricultural 
commercialisation within Africa. 
 
5 The rising powers in Africa 
 
In recent years new investors have rapidly moved into the African market, including China and Brazil. 
Between 2000 and 2008 China’s trade with Africa has grown by 33.5 per cent and in 2009 China 
overtook the US as Africa’s largest trading partner with the value of trade reaching over US$160 
billion in 2011 (Africa Research Institute 2012). Although much smaller, Brazilian trade with Africa 
has also grown by 400 per cent between 2002 and 2010, when it reached US$20.6 million . 
 
5.1 China in Africa 
 
The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy and manufacturing has led to an increasing dependence 
of China on exports and on the US market. Exports of goods and services in China account for over 40 
per cent of GDP, and a large percentage of these are destined for the US market. However, the 
economic downturn in the US and the possibility of a trade war between the US and China, as the US 
aggressively seeks to regenerate its manufacturing base, has created much consternation in China 
about its dependence on US markets. This has led to attempts to diversify Chinese trade and stimulate 
domestic demands. The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy has created demands for raw 
materials, energy, and food. China has increasingly looked for new markets in Africa to meet these 
demands. This has led to a rapid expansion of trade and investment with African countries, in which 
China is rapidly emerging as a dominant trading partner in Africa. Chinese interests in Africa are 
reflected in inter-governmental cooperation, government sponsored projects, investments by State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises, the large volume of trade manufacturers carried by 
both African and Chinese traders, and the movement of Chinese labour and small-scale investors and 
traders into Africa.  
 
Although much of the growth in China has been stimulated by neoliberal reforms and the opening of 
new markets, this has been implemented outside of the tenets of neoliberalism and governance 
reforms. Moreover, many of the reforms that have been foisted onto Southeast Asian nations by the 
US and international multilateral organisations, in the wake of the Asian crisis, have been problematic. 
Those nations that have fared best have been those that have resisted further opening of their 
economies and retrenchment of the state (Harvey 2005; Stiglitz 2002; Bullard and Bello 1998). Within 
Southeast Asia, the Chinese government has been instrumental in fostering a critical multilateral 
appraisal of neoliberal and promoting South-South dialogue (Wu and Lansdowne 2008).  
 
This notion of South-South cooperation has also been extended into diplomatic, technical and 
development cooperation relations with African nations. China has sought to develop the Forum for 
China Africa Cooperation, an intergovernmental forum through which various high-level Chinese and 
African leaders meet to define the parameters and scope of China and African developmental ties 
(Buckley, this IDS Bulletin). The China Africa Development Fund (CADFund) has opened four 
regional offices on the African continent and provides funding for projects within Africa and a bridge 
to encourage and facilitate investments of Chinese companies within Africa. The main areas of 
technical cooperation and investment are concerned with infrastructure development, communications, 
construction, dam and energy production, natural resource sectors, petroleum, mining and agriculture. 
China has established over 40 agricultural demonstration centres in African countries. It provides 
agricultural assistance that combines infrastructural development, such as in dam construction with 
technical training, input provisioning and storage facilities, and facilitating linkages between 
agricultural ministries and communities. With funding of US$1 billion in its first phase and US$2 
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billion in its second phase, the CADFund has made significant contributions to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Africa.  
 
Although China’s presence in Africa has expanded in recent years, China has a long history of ties in 
development cooperation within Africa from the 1960s. During the 1980s Chinese development 
assistance to Africa increased with numerous development projects in many countries. The Chinese 
economy has considerably expanded and transformed in recent years, and the level and nature of 
Chinese investments in Africa have rapidly expanded. However, China’s recent expansion in Africa 
has been preceded by a long history and experience of diplomatic and technical co-operation linkages, 
and participation in several multilateral forums (Guttal 2008). 
 
5.2 Brazil in Africa 
 
In contrast with China, Brazil is a relatively new player in Africa. Its policy of promoting South-South 
cooperation grows out of its regional policy in South America. Its movement into development in 
Africa is very recent, originating from the mid-2000s, with the visit of President Lula to 26 African 
countries in the early 2000s, the expansion of embassies with African countries, the organisation of the 
Brazil-Africa Forum, and the setting up of technical cooperation programmes, credits, and joint 
Chambers of Commerce for African countries (Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin; Pierri, this IDS 
Bulletin; Patriota and Pierri 2013). As with China, Brazil has been suspicious of multilateral and US 
neoliberal reform prescriptions in the wake of the Mexican and Argentinean crisis, and has 
propounded a development framework built on South-South cooperation.  
 
This is reflected in a diverse portfolio of export partners in which 55 per cent of the value of exports 
are with Latin America, 15 per cent North America, 6 per cent Central America, 8 per cent Europe, 7 
per cent Asia and 5 per cent with Africa (Aulakh 2006: 100). In contrast with China, Brazil has 
oriented its exports much more to South American markets rather than the US. Within South America, 
Brazil has been instrumental in opposing attempts to set up the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
without the conditional elimination of US agricultural subsidies, measures to ensure access to US 
markets, and changes to US policy on patents. Brazil has actively supported the development of 
Mercorsur, a common market or free trade zone whose full members include Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, and has become a strong advocate of South-South cooperation as a 
central tenet of its development policy based on economic cooperation between South American and 
African nations.  
 
This notion is based on establishing joint economic investments to promote technical cooperation. 
Like Chinese notions of South-South cooperation, this is based on non-interference, no preconditions 
attached to aid, and symmetric relations in which technical cooperation develops out of expressed 
mutual interests. The Brazilian framework of South-South cooperation in Africa stresses the 
similarities of the Brazilian and African environments, the recent technical and research successes that 
Brazil has achieved in this environment, and the transferability of these technologies to Africa (Cabral 
and Shankland 2013; World Bank and IPEA 2011). 
 
Brazilian South-South cooperation also stresses its commitment to social inclusion and the eradication 
of poverty and the successes that it has achieved in implementing its Bolsa Familia (family allowance) 
programme, which targets the poor for family assistance and provides conditional financial support 
and school feeding programmes to ensure that the children of the poor attend school (Patriota and 
Pierri 2013a; Pierri, this IDS Bulletin; World Bank and IPEA 2011; McCann 2008). In 2005, the 
Brazilian government through its Ministry of Social Development (MDS) began disseminating the 
precepts of the Bolsa Familia or Conditional Cash Transfer programme, as it came to be known 
internationally, to South Africa, Nigeria and the British Department for International Development. In 
2006, delegates from Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia made a 
study tour to Brazil. In 2007, the Ghanaian government implemented a version of the Bolsa Familia 
known as the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) Programme, and Benin is currently 
implementing a version (Stolte 2012). In 2008, the MDS, in collaboration with the Department for 
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International Development (DFID) and the International Poverty Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-
IG), launched the Africa Brazil Programme on Social Development, based on technical cooperation, 
study tours, and distance learning. The Bolsa Familia has grown into a trilateral programme, with both 
DFID and the World Bank supporting its dissemination in Africa (World Bank and IPEA 2011; 
Lindert 2006).  
 
The Brazilian government has also signed a cooperation agreement with the FAO to extend its Zero 
Hunger Programme to Africa. This works through expanding public procurement of food produced by 
smallholders for school feeding programmes and by supporting family farm production through the 
More Food Programme. The More Food Programme in Brazil seeks to raise the productivity of 
Brazil’s smallholder family farms by providing them with credit under preferential terms to acquire 
subsidised farm equipment and machinery and technical assistance. This has resulted in a dramatic 
increase of productivity of 89 per cent by area, and of income by 30 per cent. It also creates new 
markets for Brazilian agricultural technology in which 60 per cent of Brazil’s tractor sales and 41 per 
cent of its agricultural machinery workforce derived from the More Food Programme (Patriota and 
Pierri 2013; Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin). Five African countries have currently signed agreements 
for the extension of this programme into their rural settings including Ghana, Zimbabwe, Senegal, 
Kenya and Mozambique. The expansion of this programme into Africa seeks to enhance rural food 
security, increase productivity, address technology capacity issues, and create an expanded market for 
Brazilian technology. However, whether the Africa More Food Programme will create technologies 
for small and medium farmers or lead to the provision of subsidised technologies for rich farmers 
remains to be seen in the implementation of the programme. Within the African agrarian economy, 
smallholders cultivate much smaller areas than would make tractor ownership economically viable.  
 
South-South cooperation has formed a major framework in which Brazil has rapidly expanded its 
investments in Africa during the 2000s, in construction, energy, public health, agriculture, and social 
protection. In building South-South cooperation in Africa, Brazil tends to stress its cultural similarities 
with Africa, the existence of a large African diaspora in Brazil, of communities within West Africa 
that repatriated from Brazil in the nineteenth century and the similarity of the African physical 
environment with that of Brazil. However, cultural ties remain poorly developed and superficial, with 
few student and tourist cultural exchanges taking place, nor joint social studies research programmes 
been undertaken. Outside of the former Portuguese colonies there are also language barriers to 
communication. 
 
Brazil has pursued a policy of opening up the economy to international market forces and investments 
and privatising SOEs following the 1982 Latin American debt crisis. However, state regulations and 
support for local capital has enabled the rapid emergence of Brazilian multinational companies, 
particularly around natural resources, energy, construction and agribusiness. Many of these companies 
have expanded into regional South American markets and are now moving into Africa (Schneider 
2009).  
 
Agriculture accounts for three quarters of commodity exports of which the major products include soy 
products, sugar and ethanol, chicken, beef, coffee tobacco, and orange juice. Brazil is the fourth 
largest agricultural exporter in the world, and many of its agribusiness firms are now establishing 
plants in foreign countries. The largest agribusiness companies are in meat processing. The three 
major meat processors and exporters are JBS, which became the largest beef processor in the world in 
2007 following a number of aggressive takeovers, and had revenues of over US$7 billion in that year; 
and Sadia and Perdigão, which in 2008 both had revenues of nearly US$5 billion. Sadia also 
specialises in processed and frozen foods and Perdigão in dairy products (Schneider 2009). Ethanol is 
a major product, originating in attempts to create energy self-sufficiency during the period of import-
substitution. In contrast with China, Brazilian companies tend to depend upon employing local staff 
rather than Brazilians, and Brazilian economic interests are marked less by movements of Brazilians 
into Africa. Brazilian companies in Africa tend to be a select few large private sector companies rather 
than the mix of SOEs and mixed scale of private companies that characterise Chinese investments in 
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Africa. However, communications between Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa remain poor with no direct 
flights, except to South Africa. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Although South-South cooperation appears to be a recent concept in international development 
cooperation, it is the culmination of longer historical processes, and is rooted in a particular historical 
political economy. It reflects a particular trajectory of development in which import substitution 
industrialisation was replaced by export-oriented growth, but one in which the successful rising 
powers have been able to protect and nurture their own industries and make them competitive within a 
global economy. While the emerging powers have introduced forms of economic restructuring that 
have been shaped by the global economy and market liberalism, the state has played a major role in 
protecting and nurturing the growth of national capital and in creating an enabling environment for the 
growth of both national capital and international investments by national industries. This has 
facilitated the emergence of increasing economic efficiency and companies that can compete 
successfully within a global economy.  
 
Although these economic reforms have resulted in the adoption of market liberalisation, this has also 
been combined with a resistance to and critique of some of the policies advocated by the US and 
multilateral organisations, which has been carried by China into Asian regional forums and by Brazil 
into South American regional forums. South-South cooperation in Africa reflects a further extension 
of this critique into increasing competition for resources and markets with Western transnational 
companies (Amanor, this IDS Bulletin). South-South cooperation critiques the conditionalities that 
Western nations have attempted to impose on Africa, South-east Asia and South America, and 
develops an alternative framework of technical assistance based on non-intervention, respect for 
national sovereignty and national interests. Western conditionalities are seen by both the Chinese and 
Brazilian governments and policy-makers as imposing policies on Africa that do not necessarily meet 
African needs, which need to be defined by African governments and their people. The framework of 
South-South cooperation draws upon earlier frameworks of a new international economic order and 
non-alignment, although these are now framed within the concept of a market-driven economy. South-
South cooperation now reflects an economic order based on private and public sector partnerships that 
responds to the market and is willing to make large investments within African countries, and make 
provisions for infrastructural development to facilitate the emergence of a modern economy. It extends 
the competition between US multinational companies and the new multinationals agribusiness 
companies that have emerged in East Asia and Brazil onto the African continent. While US companies 
neglected Africa to invest in these new emergent economies, which were considered to have more 
potential, the companies that have emerged in these areas now see Africa as the new frontier for 
investment. This opens up African economies to rapid investment, and transforms Africa from a 
marginalised entity of exception into a frontier for future industrial and agri-industrial potential.   
 
In contrast with Western donors, these new interventions set up a synergy between infrastructure 
development, technical cooperation and capital accumulation, which creates new demands and 
markets. They do not make capital investment conditional upon the creation of an enabling 
environment. Rather than focusing on institutional reform as a pre-condition for investment, they set 
up a process of transformation and capital accumulation that generates the material conditions for 
institutional change. South-South cooperation sets up a framework of diplomatic ties to facilitate trade, 
based on notions of symmetric exchange (soft power), and the building of intergovernmental fora to 
facilitate investments and business exchange. It facilitates change pragmatically based on existing 
economic opportunities and interests in investment and accumulation. It does not attempt to pre-define 
and manage change by moralising about the nature of change.  
 
Yet in many respects these new developments have only been made possible by earlier interventions 
by Western powers, and must be seen in this historical context. These included the neoliberal 
economic conditionalities that have opened up African economies to external investment and by 
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institutional and governance reforms that came with them. In the agricultural context, the earlier 
investments in training and professional development – consolidated within the UN and CGIAR 
systems – have also substantially contributed towards the development of science, technology and 
investment within the rising powers. It is very often these same people who are part of new South-
South engagements in Africa. Although this long-running development support by Western states in 
some senses competes with Western capital, these new networks also embody alliances with fractions 
of northern capital, helping to open up new markets within Africa and international markets for 
African products within new alliances, now framed by South-South or triangular cooperation 
(Amanor, this IDS Bulletin).  
 
Thus, while frequently framed as new, different and path-breaking, we must always recognise how 
South-South cooperation builds upon pre-existing forms of international development, neoliberal 
policy frameworks and the expansion of capital in Africa. It of course adds new perspectives, actors 
and networks, including important notions of social inclusion based on a mixture of market and state 
interventions. Yet, given the weight of historical conditioning factors and the context set by market-
based reforms, both in Africa but also in the emerging powers, we must question the extent to which 
alternative, new paradigms for development cooperation can really be created within this neoliberal 
institutional framework, as development, from whatever source, acts to facilitate capital accumulation 
and new forms of market socialisation. While reconfiguring relations, introducing new actors and 
adding new discursive frames, South-South cooperation must therefore be understood in its historical, 
political economic context, and in relation to the particular, diverse, and often contradictory, interests 
of states and capital in African agriculture.  
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